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evaluated in terms of the social, political, and economic communicative 
realities they create for us to inhabit (Russell & Babrow, 2011, p. 244).  
Our argument proceeds as follows. We review definitions of risk as an 
object of inquiry in three fields dedicated to reducing uncertainty: 
banking, computer science, and disasters.  In doing so, we examine how 
definitions  construct risk as communication. We then weave together our 
own definitions of risk and risk communication and conclude with a 
reflection on how communication scholars can direct discussion to 
neglected aspects of how risk and danger are approached by industry and 
science.  
As Bernstein notes, probability is the key to the management of 
uncertainty (Bernstein, 1996; O’Doherty, 2006).  It thus makes sense that 
in spite of significant differences between fields of inquiry and application 
risk is defined across the board in probabilistic terms and accordingly at 
the intersection between the achievement of instrumentally constructed 
means to goals and the likelihood of failure and negative outcomes.   
Banking, computer science, and natural disasters all share this 
understanding of risk.  In banking, managers seek to balance the risk 
inherent in investments against the potential for profit through models 
which include value at risk (VAR).  In computer science, programmers 
and managers use models and tools that are meant to assign quantified 
values to possible error and failure rates. When preparing for the possible 
impact of natural disasters, officials seek to identify the amount of 
investment required to balance the potential magnitude of the future 
disaster.  Practices in these three fields seek to reduce uncontrolled 
agency through use of technical planning, decisions, and actions, aimed 
and building the structures needed to respond to all identified risks.  
Yet in all of these three cases, risk is constructed as extrinsic to 
communicative practices.  It is situated as an objective structure-agency 
phenomenon that precedes communication. Accordingly, it is 
unsurprising that much of the literature surrounding risk communication 
prepares organizations to meet the challenges presented by disaster with 
strong attention to detail and planning (Samansky, 2002).  This shift has 
the effect of demoting communication to the effective and clear 
management of the media from a public relations standpoint (Lundgren 
& McMakin, 2004; Heath, 1996; Hadden, 1989).  Unsurprisingly, much of 
this work is concerned with making sure that training programs are in 
place and that the given organization can present a unified message to the 
public sector that it has been charged with managing.  
Yet in problematizing the concept of risk as extrinsic to 
communicative inter-action, Otway (1992) writes, “The main product of 
risk communication is not information, but the quality of the social 
relationship it supports” (p. 227).  He recommends that communities 
move away from purely technical understandings of the events and 
toward an understanding that recognizes both the interpretive and 
emotional levels implicated in situations where property, wealth, and 
lives may be at stake.  Interpretive research in communication has 
highlighted the role of individual and situational factors in the meanings 
of risk through which individuals interpret from their everyday talk 
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(Edwards, 1998).  Individual differences along gender lines, or personal 
characteristics like loneliness, and ego-involvement are associated with 
how individuals make sense of messages as more or less credible, honest, 
and competent (Bello & Edwards, 2005; Edwards, et al., 2001).  
Insufficient as they are these discoveries point to the fracturing of the 
illusion of expert infallibility, and lead to more recent studies that suggest 
that risk is not so much a question of management as of shifting our 
collective understanding to the realities of unpredictability (Biocca, 
2004).  This means embracing many of the traditional enemies of science 
such as complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity (Renn, 2003). In turn, 
this enhanced appreciation of the unknowable in the risk equation has led 
some scholars to suggest a more rhetorically sensitive interpretive 
framework for bridging the gaps in trust between expert and lay 
communities (Millar & Heath, 2004).  
As complexity and ambiguity enter the picture, the role of 
communication as an aspect of risk comes into sharper focus.  Our own 
scholarship tackles the complexities that emerge in constructing risk in 
this way.  
In his presentation "Evolutionary Software Development to Reduce 
Risk," Steven Gibson suggests an approach to objectively reducing risks in 
industries that include software development through modified 
documentation and citation methods.  Gibson examines a partial test case 
using an approach to documentation of software evolution using the 
citation techniques applied in scholarly research; he relates how 
communications researchers can contribute to software risk reduction by 
helping build ontologies of best-of- breed software and advising in 
dissemination and documentation of the software resources as they are 
developed.  
Similar approaches have been attempted in industries, including the 
development of ISO 31000 and specialized software frameworks and 
documentation. Gibson illustrates his methodological approach by means 
of a test case of a software system employing documentation and citation. 
This study foregrounds approaches communication scholars can take to 
make contributions to computer science.  
In “Hedging Disaster:  Rhetorics of Risk, Mitigation, Normalcy and 
Necessity,” Stephanie Houston Grey explores the relationship between a 
postmodern risk economy and the creation of scientific and economic 
objects during times of natural disaster.   The Deepwater Horizon oil spill 
of 2010 was  rhetorically framed in the media as the product of an 
economy that perpetually wavers on the edge of apocalypse, driven by a 
hunger for consumption and excess risk.  Within this “accursed share,” to 
use Georges Bataille’s (1991) term for the excess energy by which an 
economy may proceed undeterred to its ruin, Grey argues that risk 
management is no longer concerned with caution or risk avoidance, but 
instead aims to normalize and operationalize risk even while increasing 
our tolerance for it.  Grey’s work traces the Deepwater Horizon disaster as 
a valuation – or, a construction of its worth as a tangible commodity – 
though which the relatively unknown and underexplored “deepwater” 
Gulf of Mexico has been converted into an object of study with scientific, 
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political as well as economic overtones in the form of a financial bottom-
line.  This progression culminates in the process of Natural Resource 
Damage Assessment which seeks an inclusive, but palatable dollar figure 
for the disaster, establishing a finite cost that the risk economy is capable 
of absorbing. 
Mariaelena Bartesaghi’s “Risk as Social Interaction: Revisiting 
Hurricane Katrina,” employed discourse analyses to examine over four 
hours of “fateful conversation” via audiorecorded telephone meetings 
between local, state, and federal officials in the days immediately before 
and following Katrina’s landfall on New Orleans (Whalen, Zimmermann, 
& Whalen, 1989).  By exploring decision making as exhibiting a pragmatic 
tension between risk and danger, Bartesaghi proposes that risk was in fact 
constituted in and through participants’ strategies of assessing 
uncertainty, making Katrina into a communicative disaster.  
First, Bartesaghi examines how evacuation of the citizens of New 
Orleans was achieved by the speakers as an outcome of the interactional 
machinery. Machinery is explained: in terms of how single utterances 
encode risk (e.g., pronoun switches, modals, if-then formulations) as well 
as structural features of the interaction (turn-taking, question-answer 
sequences, and meta communication). Bartesaghi examines how both 
single utterances and structural features point to broader logic of context 
of “acting jointly” and “speaking with one voice.” Speakers endeavored to 
maintain this and which was moderated as a violation. Explicating this 
context in terms of strategies of uncertainty where claims insufficient 
knowledge may serve useful purposes, Bartesaghi shows how both 
directness and indirection can be fruitfully understood as ways of 
accomplishing action.  In the case of direct communication, Bartesaghi 
identifies these as acting alone, premature action, and lack of 
information. In the case of indirect communication dilemmas were acting 
collectively, delayed action, and lack of follow-up.  
As these three authors have attempted to posit, rhetorical 
contribution to risk communication should begin with deconstructing the 
taken-for-granted knowledge of the risk society and shed light on its blind 
spots. It should then move toward, “the task of discovering…the available 
means of constructing better social worlds” (Russell & Babrow, 2011, p. 
256). To conceptualize risk as endogenous to social interaction challenges 
prevailing notions that participants are not accountable for creating 
uncertainty, that uncertainty is not a rhetorical strategy in risk settings, 
and that risk is not itself a dynamic between participants in a situation of 
uncertainty; as well, it allows us, as communication scholars to move past 
the structure-agency dichotomy that we inherited from other fields 
(Bartesaghi & Castor, 2009). 
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